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Ordered into Oblivion: How Courts Have 
Rendered the Georgia Whistleblower Act Useless, 




In Georgia, the Georgia Whistleblower Act (“GWA”) protects public 
employees who report unlawful activity. Recent court decisions have 
reduced the GWA to a state of uselessness.  Federal whistleblower law 
provides useful insights on how the Georgia General Assembly can amend 
the GWA to restore and enhance its effectiveness. This article details the 
history of the GWA and recent court decisions. The article then examines 
federal whistleblower law. Finally, it provides recommendations, including 
draft amendment language. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Whistleblowers—those who disclose illegal, immoral, or illegitimate 
practices of their employers to those in a position to rectify those 
practices—serve important functions in our society.1 By exposing illegal 
actions, whistleblowers “expose, deter, and curtail wrongdoing.”2  
Recognizing the importance of protecting whistleblowers, the federal 
 
* Principal, The Law Office of Micah Barry; Of Counsel, The Kirby G. Smith Law Firm, 
LLC; Ph.D. anticipated 2021, University of Georgia College of Education; J.D. 2014, 
University of Toledo College of Law; B.A. 2010 The Ohio State University. I would like 
to thank Kirby G. Smith and Amanda Brookhuis. 
1 See Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Integrating Trends in Whistleblowing and 
Corporate Governance: Promoting Organizational Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility, 
and Employee Empowerment, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 178 (2002). 
2 See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State 
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 100 (2000). 
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government and all fifty states have enacted whistleblower protection 
statutes.3 
In Georgia, public employees receive whistleblower protections from the 
Georgia Whistleblower Act (“GWA”).4 Enacted in 1993, the GWA initially 
only covered members of the Executive Branch of the state, excluding the 
Governor’s Office, but it has since been expanded to cover all state and 
local government employees in Georgia.5 As this article will show, recent 
developments in case law under the GWA have drastically reduced the 
whistleblower protections afforded to public employees in the state, and the 
statute is due for an amendment. 
Part II of this article will provide details of the GWA’s statutory 
language and the state of the GWA prior to 2015. Part III will discuss recent 
developments in GWA litigation, including updated case law and a trend 
the author has personally seen in the course of litigating several cases under 
the GWA. Part IV will examine the federal Whistleblower Protection Act 
(“WPA”) and the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (“WPEA”). 
 
3 See Robert G. Vaughn, State Whistleblower Status and the Future of Whistleblower 
Protection Symposium: Whistleblower Protection, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 581, 581–83 
(1999) (collecting statutes). 
4 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4. Literature on the GWA is divided about what to call the statute, as 
no title appears in the body of the act. Compare Seth Eisenberg, Public Officers and 
Employees - General Provisions, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 309, 311 (2007) (referring to the 
statute as the “Whistleblower Protection Act” and using the acronym “WPA”), with 
Kimberly J. Doud, Recent Development: Public Employment Whistle-Blowers Act: North 
Georgia Regional Educational Service Agency v. Weaver: 527 S.E.2d 864 (Ga. 2000), 30 
STETSON L. REV. 1233, 1233–34 (2000) (referring to the statute as “Georgia’s 
whistleblower statute”), and Murray-Obertein v. Georgia Gov’t Transparency and 
Campaign Fin. Comm’n, 812 S.E.2d 28, 29 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (referring to the statute 
as the “Georgia Whistleblower Act” and using the acronym “GWA”). The statute bears 
the section title “Complaint or information from public employees as to fraud, waste, and 
abuse in state programs and operations.” O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4. Within the practice area, 
“Georgia Whistleblower Act” and “GWA” have become the norm. 
5 Seth Eisenberg, Public Officers and Employees - General Provisions, 24 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 309, 311–13; 216–17 (2007); see also 2005 Ga. H.B. 665; 2007 Ga. H.B. 16. The 
statute was further amended in 2009 and 2011 to reflect administrative changes to certain 
administrative agencies in the state. See 2009 Ga. S.B. 97; 2011 Ga. H.B. 642. 
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Part V will provide the author’s recommendation for amendment to the 
GWA. Finally, Part VI will briefly conclude. 
II. GWA: THE BASICS 
A. The Statute 
The GWA is divided into six subsections, labeled (a)-(f).  Subsection (a) 
provides definitions for various terms used in the statute. The definitions 
will only be recited here as they become relevant to explain other 
provisions of the GWA. Two definitions, however, are important from the 
beginning: “public employer” and “public employee.” 
The GWA defines a “public employer” as: 
[T]he executive, judicial, or legislative branch of the state; any 
other department, board, bureau, commission, authority, or other 
agency of the state which employs or appoints a public employee 
or public employees; or any local or regional governmental entity 
that receives any funds from the State of Georgia or any state 
agency.6 
Section (a)(3) provides: 
‘Public employee’ means any person who is employed by the 
executive, judicial, or legislative branch of the state or by any 
other department, board, bureau, commission, authority, or other 
agency of the state.  This term also includes all employees, 
officials, and administrators of any agency covered by the rules of 
the State Personnel Board and any local or regional governmental 
entity that receives any funds from the State of Georgia or any 
state agency.7 
Subsection (b) of the GWA permits public employers to receive and 
investigate complaints and report regarding possible “fraud, waste, and 
abuse in or relating to any state programs and operations under the 
 
6 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(4). 
7 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(3). 
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jurisdiction of such public employer.”8 This subsection grants public 
employers jurisdiction to handle complaints and investigations internally, 
rather than having to involve the state government or law enforcement with 
every report.9 But, “fraud, waste, and abuse” are not defined in the statute. 
Subsection (c) provides for the confidentiality of public employees who 
complain. The subsection does not specify whether it applies to all 
complaints of fraud, waste, and abuse. As discussed below, the anti-
retaliation provision of subsection (d) is narrower than the jurisdictional 
provision of (b). It is unclear where subsection (c) falls, and no case law 
provides clarity. Presumably, subsection (c) applies to all reports under (b). 
Subsection (d) is the anti-retaliation provision of the GWA. It provides: 
(1) No public employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any policy or 
practice preventing a public employee from disclosing a violation 
of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a 
supervisor or a government agency. 
(2) No public employer shall retaliate against a public employee 
for disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or 
regulation to either a supervisor or a government agency, unless 
the disclosure was made with knowledge that the disclosure was 
false or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. 
(3) No public employer shall retaliate against a public employee 
for objecting to, or refusing to participate in, any activity, policy, 
or practice of the public employer that the public employee has 
reasonable cause to believe is in violation of or noncompliance 
with a law, rule, or regulation. 
(4) Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subsection shall not apply to 
policies or practices which implement, or to actions by public 
employers against public employees who violate, privilege or 
 
8 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(b). 
9 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(b); see also Colon v. Fulton Cty., 751 S.E.2d 307, 311–12 (Ga. 
2013). 
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confidentiality obligations recognized by constitutional, statutory, 
or common law.10 
Several terms in subsection (d) are defined in subsection (a). “Law, rule 
or regulation” means “any federal, state, or local statute or ordinance or any 
rule or regulation adopted according to any federal, state, or local statute or 
ordinance.”11 A “supervisor” is any person 
(A) To whom a public employer has given authority to direct and 
control the work performance of the affected public employee; 
(B) To whom a public employer has given authority to take 
corrective action regarding a violation of or noncompliance with a 
law, rule or regulation of which the public employee complains; or 
(C) Who has been designated by a public employer to receive 
complaints regarding a violation of or noncompliance with a law, 
rule, or regulation.12 
“Government agency” means any agency of federal, state, or local 
government charged with the enforcement of laws, rules, or regulations.13 
Finally, 
“Retaliate” or “retaliation” refers to the discharge, suspension, or 
demotion by a public employer of a public employee or any other 
adverse employment action taken by a public employer against a 
public employee in the terms or conditions of employment for 
disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or 
regulation to either a supervisor or government agency.14 
Subsections (e) and (f) provide the right of action, jurisdictional 
limitation, statute of limitations, and remedies for whistleblowers. Actions 
under the GWA cannot be brought in a magistrate court or state court; they 
 
10 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d). 
11 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(2). 
12 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(6). 
13 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(1). 
14 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(5). 
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must be brought in superior court.15 The statute of limitations is one year 
after discovery of the retaliation, with a three-year statute of repose.16 The 
remedies for a successful public employee include: an injunction restraining 
continued violations; reinstatement to the same or an equivalent position; 
reinstatement of fringe benefits and seniority; lost wages, benefits, and 
other remuneration; compensatory damages; and reasonable attorney’s fees, 
costs, and expenses.17 
B. The GWA Prior to 2015 
Prior to 2015, the exact framework for analyzing GWA claims was 
unclear. Unofficially, courts used the federal McDonnell Douglas 
framework for analyzing cases.18 
Under the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff 
must first create an inference of discrimination through his prima 
facie case. Once the plaintiff has made out the elements of the 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a 
non-discriminatory basis for its employment action. If the 
employer meets this burden, the inference of discrimination drops 
out of the case entirely, and the plaintiff has the opportunity to 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered 
reasons were pretextual. Where the plaintiff succeeds in 
discrediting the employer’s proffered reasons, the trier of fact may 
conclude that the employer intentionally discriminated.19 
 To show a prima facie case of retaliation under the GWA, a plaintiff had 
to show that: 
 
15 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4-(e)(1). 
16 Id. 
17 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(e)(2)–(f). 
18 Forrester v. Georgia Dep’t of Human Servs., 708 S.E.2d 660, 665–66 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2011) (physical precedent only). But see Freeman v. Smith, 750 S.E.2d 739, 741–42 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2013) (declining to formally adopt the McDonnell Douglas framework). 
19 Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767–68 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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(1) the employer falls under the statute’s definition of a ‘public 
employer’; (2) the employee disclosed a violation of or 
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor 
or government agency; (3) the employee was then discharged, 
suspended, demoted, or suffered some other adverse employment 
decision by the public employer; and (4) there is some causal 
relation between (2) and (3).20 
For the sake of brevity, the first element will be referred to as coverage, the 
second as protected activity, the third as an adverse action, and the fourth as 
causation. While early GWA litigation focused on coverage, these cases 
became irrelevant after the statute was amended to increase the scope of 
public employers and public employees.21 Following the GWA 
amendments, coverage ceased being a serious issue in litigation, with one 
exception that will be discussed in Part III.22 
As mentioned above, the anti-retaliation provision of the GWA protects 
reports of or objections to “violation[s] of or noncompliance with a law, 
rule, or regulation,” while the jurisdictional section covers reports of “fraud, 
waste, or abuse.”23 The anti-retaliation provision is narrower in scope. 
Reporting theft by employees from the employer was protected.24 But 
reporting embezzlement by an employee at a prior employer was not 
protected.25 Reporting general safety concerns was also not protected.26 
Reporting personal concerns intended to get help for a troubled friend and 
 
20 Forrester, 708 S.E.2d at 666. 
21 See, e.g., N. Ga. Reg’l Educ. Serv. Agency v. Weaver, 527 S.E.2d 864 (Ga. 2000); see 
also Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 311–13, 316–17; 2005 Ga. H.B. 665; 2007 Ga. H.B. 16. 
22 See, e.g., Forrester, 708 S.E.2d  at 666–67 (physical precedent only). 
23 Compare O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d), with O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a). 
24 Jones v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 585 S.E.2d 138, 143 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2003). 
25 Brathwaite v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 729 S.E.2d 625, 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). 
26 Edmonds v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 689 S.E.2d 352, 357 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
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coworker also did not constitute protected activity.27 Objecting to conduct 
that could amount to obstruction of justice, however, was protected.28 
The statute provides that “discharge, suspension, [and] demotion” are 
adverse actions.29  In Jones v. Board of Regents of the University System of 
Georgia, the Georgia Court of Appeals considered whether resigning in lieu 
of termination (often referred to as “involuntary resignation”) constituted an 
adverse action.30 The Jones court answered in the affirmative.31  While this 
rule is still the general consensus, the Jones court based its reasoning—at 
least in part—on language in a prior version of the GWA that prohibited 
threatening action against an employee.32 That language was removed from 
the statute with the 2005 amendment.33 When the issue seemed to reappear 
in Albers v. Georgia Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 
the Albers court held that giving an employee the option of resigning under 
threat of termination did not constitute an adverse action for the purposes of 
the statute of limitations where the employee did not resign and was not 
terminated until months later.34 Because Albers did not specifically address 
Jones or its reasoning, and because Jones has not been overruled by any 
subsequent cases, Jones may still be good law despite the statutory 
amendment. 
The statute also mentions “other adverse employment action[s].”35 In 
Freeman v. Smith, the Georgia Court of Appeals incorporated federal Title 
 
27 Forrester 708 S.E.2d at 667–68. 
28 Albers v. Georgia Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 766 S.E.2d 520, 523 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2014). 
29 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(5). 




33 2005 Ga. H.B. 665. 
34 Albers v. Georgia Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 766 S.E.2d 520, 524–26 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2014). 
35 Id. 
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VII cases to determine whether an action was “materially adverse.”36 Under 
Title VII case law, an action is materially adverse if “a reasonable employee 
would have found the challenged action materially adverse, meaning that it 
might well have dissuaded a reasonable employee from making the 
statutorily-protected disclosure.”37 Further, “The actionable employer 
conduct must be ‘significant,’ rather than ‘trivial.”38  For example, 
informing an employee that her subordinate is about to be transferred away 
did not rise to the level of an adverse action.39 There is also confusion 
regarding when a transfer is actionable due to a lack of case law and the 
refusal of the General Assembly to include “transfer” in the statute after it 
had been proposed.40 
For the final prima facie element, indicia of causation included temporal 
proximity between the protected activity and adverse action, a supervisor’s 
reaction to the protected activity, and evidence of pretext.41 For temporal 
proximity, the general rule was that an adverse action must accrue within 
three months of the protected activity; delay beyond three months was 
generally fatal to a claim.42 A GWA plaintiff could survive substantial 
delay, however, if there was other evidence suggesting causation.43 
After the employer articulated a legitimate non-retaliatory business 
reason for the adverse action, the employee needed to show that the reason 
was pretextual.44 The employee could show the reason was pretextual 
 
36 Freeman v. Smith, 750 S.E.2d 739, 744 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). 
37 Id. at 744 (citing Cobb v. City of Roswell, 533 Fed. Appx. 888, 896 (11th Cir. 2013)). 
38 Id. (citing Burlington Northern & Santa Fe R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67–68 
(2006)). 
39 Id. 
40 See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 315–16, 318–19. 
41 Jones v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 585 S.E.2d 138, 143–44 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2003). 
42 See Freeman v. Smith, 750 S.E.2d 739, 743 (2013); see also Albers v. Georgia Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 766 S.E.2d 520, 524 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). 
43 Albers, 766 S.E.2d at 524. 
44 Forrester v. Georgia Dep’t of Human Servs., 708 S.E.2d 660, 666 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) 
(physical precedent only). 
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through direct evidence that contradicted the employer’s reason or 
circumstantial evidence suggesting that the proffered reason was not the 
actual reason for the adverse action.45 Circumstantial evidence of pretext 
included inconsistencies in stated reasons for the adverse action, evidence 
of reactions to protected activity, comparator evidence of similarly situated 
employees who were treated differently, and close temporal proximity.46 
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GWA CASE LAW 
Since 2015, the appellate courts have trended towards declining 
procedural hurdles for plaintiffs but increasing substantive requirements to 
a level that has practically eliminated a GWA plaintiff’s chance of success. 
As a result of recent cases, interpretation of the GWA has diverged from 
prior case law so substantially that it is no longer effectual. 
In Tuohy v. City of Atlanta, the Georgia Court of Appeals embraced the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.47 The Tuohy court, 
however, confused several lawyers practicing in the area. Its discussion of 
pretext was odd. The Tuohy court first quoted Bailey v. Stonecrest Condo 
Association, for the following passage: “In discussing this issue, the 
Georgia Supreme Court has held that pretext is established by a direct 
showing that discriminatory reason more likely motivated the defendant or 
by an indirect showing that the defendant’s explanation is not credible.”48 
This was consistent with the pretext analysis used in Caldon.49 
The Tuohy court then quoted an unreported Eleventh Circuit case for the 
following proposition: 
 
45 Caldon v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 715 S.E.2d 487, 490 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2011). 
46 Id. at 491. 
47 Tuohy v. City of Atlanta, 771 S.E.2d 501, 504–05 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). 
48 Tuohy, 771 S.E.2d. at 506 (quoting Bailey v. Stonecrest Condo Ass’n, 696 S.E.2d 462, 
468–69 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)). 
49 Caldon, 715 S.E.2d. at 490. 
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A reason is not pretextual unless it is shown both that the reason 
was false, and that discrimination or retaliation was the real 
reason. If the proffered reason is one that might motivate a 
reasonable employer, an employee must meet that reason head on 
and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by simply 
quarreling with the wisdom of that reason, or showing that the 
decision was based on erroneous facts.50 
This new test is virtually impossible to meet. It converts what was 
previously an “or” into an “and.”  An employee must provide direct 
evidence of retaliation and disprove whatever reason the employer concocts 
after the employer has had time to search for a “legitimate” reason. The 
idea that an employee must disprove every alleged reason for an adverse 
action and prove that retaliation was the real reason in order to survive 
summary judgment and get to trial makes no sense. Georgia is a strongly at-
will jurisdiction.51 Georgia courts “typically adjudicate against employees 
claiming wrongful discharge, regardless of the reason for the 
termination.”52 Given this hostility, a GWA plaintiff can only see a jury if 
the plaintiff can prove that they never engaged in any misconduct, never 
experienced even a temporary performance decline, and never made a 
single mistake. This standard is impossible to meet. Plaintiffs are left 
hoping that their defendants’ lawyers make a mistake during the course of 
investigation or litigation and provide only false accusations. 
The chain of citations for the quote providing this new test leads to St. 
Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, a Supreme Court case that dealt with the 
issue of when a plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment, not when a 
 
50 Tuohy, 771 S.E.2d. at 506 (quoting Tarmas v. Secretary of the Navy, 433 Fed. Appx. 
754, 761 (11th Cir. 2011)). 
51 Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 309–11. 
52 Id. at 310. 
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plaintiff survives a defendant’s motion for summary judgment.53 The Court 
stated, 
Thus, rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the 
trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, 
and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such 
rejection, no additional proof of discrimination is required. But the 
Court of Appeals’ holding that rejection of the defendant’s 
proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff disregards the 
fundamental principal . . . that a presumption does not shift the 
burden of proof, and ignores our repeated admonition that the Title 
VII plaintiff at all times bears the ultimate burden of persuasion.54 
The Tuohy court declined to choose between the two tests it provided, 
stating that the plaintiff could not survive summary judgment under either.55 
By providing this new test, however, the Tuohy court opened a veritable 
Pandora’s box in trial courts, with government defendants claiming that the 
new—significantly harsher—test applies.56  In at least one case, the author 
could only argue—unsuccessfully—that the Tuohy court did not actually 
create a new test, based on the court’s failure to apply the test.57 The 
situation became even worse, however, when the Georgia Court of Appeals 
confirmed the new test in Harris v. City of Atlanta.58 
In the next published case from the Georgia Court of Appeals after 
Tuohy, Franklin v. Eaves, GWA plaintiffs received some good news.59 In 
Franklin, the plaintiff stated at summary judgment that the first act of 
retaliation against her (the removal of some of her job duties) occurred on 
 
53 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (2013). The Tuohy court quoted 
Tarmas v. Sec’y of the Navy, 433 Fed. Appx. 754, 761 (11th Cir. 2011), which cited 
Brooks v. Cty. Comm’n, 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006), which quoted St. Mary’s. 
54 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
55 Tuohy v. City of Atlanta, 771 S.E.2d 501, 506–07 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). 
56 Due to confidentiality concerns, the author is unable to provide specific trial court 
citations. This assertion is based on experience in GWA litigation. 
57 The author is unable to disclose the case citation due to confidentiality concerns. 
58 Harris v. City of Atlanta, 813 S.E.2d 420, 424 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). 
59 Franklin v. Eaves, 787 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). 
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August 27, 2012.60 Additional acts of retaliation were alleged to have 
occurred on October 12, 2012, October 17, 2012, December 2012, January 
25, 2013, and June 2013.61  The plaintiff filed her GWA claim on October 
11, 2013, more than one year from the first act of retaliation.62 The trial 
court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the grounds that the 
action was past the one-year statute of limitations.63 
On appeal, Franklin argued that she did not learn of the August and 
October actions until October 24, 2012, which was within one year of her 
filing.64 The court allowed this argument to succeed, stating that Franklin 
was not required to argue that she did not discover the retaliation until later 
when the defendant bore the burden of proving that the action was filed late 
and relied solely on a limited admission that the first act of retaliation 
actually occurred prior to October 11, 2012.65 The Franklin court also 
adopted provisions of federal law that state that each discrete adverse action 
is independently actionable and carries its own statute of limitations.66 
Following Franklin were a pair of plaintiff-friendly cases. In West v. City 
of Albany, the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Georgia faced a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on a failure to 
provide the city with ante litem notice pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5.67 
The district court, unsure whether ante litem notice was required in GWA 
cases, certified the question to the Georgia Supreme Court.68 At roughly the 
same time, in Riggins v. City of Atlanta, the Fulton County Superior Courts 
 




64 Franklin, 787 S.E.2d 270. The date of discovery was apparently in the evidence at the 
trial court, but was not argued until the appeal. Id. at 268–71. 
65 Id. at 271. 
66 Id. at 270–71 (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 
(2002)). 
67 West v. City of Albany, 797 S.E.2d 809, 810 (Ga. 2017). 
68 Id. 
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dismissed a complaint based upon the failure to provide ante litem notice 
under O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5.69 
The municipal ante litem requirement states in part: 
(a) No person, firm, or corporation having a claim for money 
damages against any municipal corporation on account of injuries 
to person or property shall bring any action against the municipal 
corporation for such injuries, without first giving notice as 
provided in the Code section. 
(b) Within six months of the happening of the event upon which a 
claim against a municipal corporation is predicated, the person, 
firm, or corporation having the claim shall present the claim in 
writing to the governing authority of the municipal corporation for 
adjustment, stating the time, place, and extent of the injury, as 
nearly as practicable, and the negligence which caused the injury. 
No action shall be entertained by the courts against the municipal 
corporation until the cause of action therein has first been 
presented to the governing authority for adjustment.70 
The Georgia Court of Appeals had previously ruled that the state ante 
litem notice requirement did not apply to GWA claims, which could 
independently effect a waiver of sovereign immunity.71 Given the precedent 
set by Tuttle and the clear references to negligence in the municipal statute, 
this pair of cases surprised many in the practice who assumed that the ante 
litem statutes applied to torts, not the GWA. Luckily, the Georgia Supreme 
Court ruled that the municipal ante litem requirement did not apply to the 
GWA.72 The Georgia Court of Appeals soon followed the rule set by West 
and reversed the Fulton County Superior Court’s dismissal of the Riggins 
GWA claim.73 
 
69 Riggins v. City of Atlanta, 798 S.E.2d 730, 730–31 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). 
70 O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5. 
71 Tuttle v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 756 S.E.2d 585, 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2014). 
72 West, 797 S.E.2d at 814. 
73 Riggins, 798 S.E.2d. at 730–31. 
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After a few helpful decisions, the decision in Coward v. MCG Health, 
Inc. dashed the plaintiffs’ hopes.74 In Coward, the employer terminated two 
nurses for allegedly complaining that chronic short-staffing nearly led to a 
psychiatric patient’s suicide.75 At summary judgment, the defendant argued 
that the plaintiffs had only reported and objected to general safety concerns, 
which are not protected.76 But there was a complication. While preparing 
the response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the 
plaintiffs’ attorney discovered that the chronic short-staffing, if true, did 
violate a law, rule, or regulation.77 
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding that 
the plaintiffs had not engaged in protected activity.78 On appeal, the 
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed.79 The court qualified its ruling by 
saying, “[i]n reaching this conclusion, we need not determine what 
terminology is required to trigger the protections of the Whistleblower 
Statute, nor do we believe that the statute requires specific magic words.”80 
But the court was clear that an employee must allege and disclose that the 
employer is violating a law, rule, or regulation prior to termination.81 
This new rule is devastating for GWA plaintiffs. Requiring employees to 
identify a law, rule, or regulation prior to termination shrinks the pool of 
potentially successful plaintiffs to those with legal training. Based on the 
author’s experience as an employment litigator, the chances of an average 
 
74 Coward v. MCG Health, Inc., 802 S.E.2d 396 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). 
75 Id. at 397–98. 
76 Id. at 399–400; see also Edmonds v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 689 
S.E.2d 352, 357 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). 
77 The court does not specifically state this, but it said, “Coward did not allege that MCG 
Health violated a law, rule, or regulation until she filed her response to MCG Health’s 
motion for summary judgment.” Coward, 802 S.E.2d at 400. The court also stated, 
“Bargerorn, like Coward, did not disclose a violation or failure to comply with any law, 
rule, or regulation prior to her termination.” Id. 
78 Id. at 397. 
79 Id. at 401. 
80 Coward, 802 S.E.2d. at 400. 
81 Id. at 400. 
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employee knowing the law is beyond slim. Coward presents a common 
scenario: one in which an employee reports something wrong, gets fired, 
and then hires an attorney, who must then determine whether the report was 
sufficient. The statutory scheme covers the lack of legal knowledge on the 
part of the general populace. The provision of the GWA that protects 
disclosures protects them so long as they are not “made with knowledge 
that the disclosure is false or with reckless disregard for its truth or 
falsity.”82 The objection provision covers objections and refusals to 
participate in any practice the employee “has reasonable cause to believe is 
in violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation.”83 
The next GWA case to come out of the Georgia Court of Appeals was 
Murray-Obertein v. Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign 
Finance Commission.84  In Murray-Obertein, the Georgia Court of Appeals 
resurrected an old question: Who is covered by the GWA? The issue in 
Murray-Obertein was whether former employees are protected from 
retaliation.85 After a dispute with her employer ended in settlement, the 
Executive Secretary of Murray-Obertein’s employer began making 
derogatory comments about her to the media.86 
Murray-Obertein looked to recent cases solidifying the relationship 
between the GWA and federal retaliation law under Title VII; she then 
argued that the rule in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. should apply.87 The 
Robinson Court held that Title VII protected former employees from 
retaliation.88 Even though it reaffirmed acceptance of the federal McDonnell 
 
82 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(2). 
83 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(3). 
84 Murray-Obertein v. Ga. Gov’t Transparency and Campaign Fin. Comm’n, 812 S.E.2d 
28 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). 
85 Id. at 29. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 30 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)). 
88 Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346. 
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Douglas framework, the Georgia Court of Appeals declined to follow 
federal cases for former employees.89 
The Murray-Obertein decision harms plaintiffs, who suffer substantial 
disadvantages finding new jobs and often have to leave their profession or 
industry entirely.90 This decision results in a near absence of protections for 
(1) bad references that are misleading but do not rise to the level of 
defamation; (2) statements to licensing agencies regarding the plaintiff’s 
termination; (3) statements to the media designed to harm the plaintiff’s 
reputation; and (4) pension denials when the pensions are not governed by 
ERISA. 
The next GWA case to come before the Georgia Court of Appeals was 
the return of Franklin v. Eaves,91 this time named Franklin v. Pitts.92 After 
the case returned to the trial court, the court granted summary judgment to 
the defendant.93 It ruled that: (1) the plaintiff failed to establish protected 
activity; (2) all but two alleged adverse actions did not rise to the level of 
adverse actions; (3) the plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection 
between the alleged protected activity and the alleged adverse actions; and 
(4) the plaintiff failed to establish pretext for the two accepted adverse 
actions.94 The court only considered rulings (2) and (4).95 
The trial court counted two transfer/promotion opportunity denials as 
adverse actions.96 The court did not count a third job opportunity as an 
adverse action because the plaintiff provided “no evidence showing that the 
 
89 Murray-Obertein, 812 S.E.2d. at 30–31. 
90 See Leora F. Eisenstadt & Jennifer M. Pacella, Whistleblowers Need Not Apply, 55 
AM. BUS. L.J. 665, 666–669 (2018) (detailing stories of whistleblowers). 
91 See supra nn.57–64. 
92 Franklin v. Pitts, 826 S.E.2d 427, 430 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). The defendant’s name was 
changed because the chairman of the Fulton County Board of Commissioners—who was 
sued in his official capacity—changed. See id. 
93 Id. at 430–31. 
94 Id. at 431–32. 
95 See id. at 439. 
96 Id. at 432. 
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County denied her a specific transfer opportunity.”97 The remaining 
potential adverse actions were: “delaying a request to attend a training 
session; change of job duties from credentialing providers and credit card 
processing to electronic funds transfer duties; [and] denial of leave requests 
and requests for documentation of leave.”98 
The court had to decide whether these counted as adverse actions, and the 
court framed the discussion around whether to adopt the Title VII standard 
for substantive discrimination or for retaliation.99 The court noted that the 
Eleventh Circuit has described the federal retaliation standard as “materially 
adverse,” while referring to the substantive discrimination standard as 
“serious and material change in terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment.”100 Which standard would apply was decisive; similar adverse 
actions were covered in the applicable federal case, Burlington Northern 
and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White.101 
In Burlington North, the plaintiff—the sole female employee in her 
department—complained that her supervisor was making sexual and 
discriminatory comments to and about her.102 The supervisor was punished, 
but—later that same month and during the same meeting wherein the 
plaintiff was informed of the supervisor’s discipline—the plaintiff’s 
employer told her that she was being moved from operating a forklift to 
 
97 Id. at 432 n.3. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 433–34. 
100 Id. at 434 (citing Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 974 n.14 (11th Cir. 2008). 
101 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). For those who are 
new to employment law, please note that the Georgia Court of Appeals referred to the 
Burlington North standard as the “Burlington standard.” See Pitts, 826 S.E.2d 427 at 434-
35. Practitioners in the area are familiar with a Burlington North standard, which is 
discussed here, and a separate Burlington standard, which concerns sexual harassment 
and comes from the case Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,  524 U.S. 742 (1998). For 
the author’s sanity, this paper will use the industry norm and refer to the “Burlington 
North standard.” 
102 Burlington North, 548 U.S. at 57–58. 
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general laborer tasks.103 After the plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, her employer charged her with 
insubordination and suspended her pay.104 Although the plaintiff 
experienced thirty-seven days of suspension without pay, the suspension 
was reversed through an internal grievance process, and she was awarded 
backpay for the thirty-seven days, bringing her lost wages to $0.105 
After comparing the statutory text of Title VII’s prohibition on 
discrimination with the prohibition on retaliation, the Court concluded that 
the prohibition on retaliation was broader than the prohibition on 
discrimination.106 Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer – 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 107 
Title VII’s prohibition on retaliation states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for 
employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-
management committee controlling apprenticeship or other 
training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to 
discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to 
 
103 Id. at 58. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 58–59. 
106 Id. at 61–64. 
107 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
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discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for 
membership, because he has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he 
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
subchapter. 108 
The Court then set forth the Burlington North standard, which is: “[A] 
plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the 
challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well 
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a 
charge of discrimination.”109 Reassignments and suspensions, even when 
the employee suffers no loss of pay or status, can act as a deterrent or serve 
as a symbolic punishment.110 These actions are, therefore, actionable in 
retaliation cases.111 This standard was used in Freeman v. Smith, as detailed 
in the prior section.112 
Faced with similar adverse actions, the Georgia Court of Appeals took 
the same basic approach: they compared the text of the GWA with the anti-
discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII.113 Concluding 
that the GWA’s language is closer to Title VII’s anti-discrimination 
provision, the court concluded that the Burlington North standard is not 
appropriate for GWA cases.114 The court then adopted the stricter “serious 
and material change in terms, conditions or privileges of employment,” and 
found that the challenged adverse actions did not rise to the necessary level 
to be actionable under the GWA.115 
 
108 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
109 Burlington North, 548 U.S. at 68 (internal quotations omitted). 
110 Id. at 70–73. 
111 Id. 
112  Freeman v. Smith, 750 S.E.2d 739 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); see supra nn.34–38. 
113  Franklin v. Pitts, 826 S.E.2d 427, 433–35 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). 
114 Id. at 434–35. 
115 Id. at 437–38. 
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Turning to the remaining adverse actions—the denial of two 
transfers/promotions—the court reaffirmed the Tuohy and Harris standard 
of pretext.116 Because of the harshness of this standard, the plaintiff was 
unable to show pretext, and the grant of summary judgment was 
affirmed.117 
Adopting the anti-discrimination standard instead of the anti-retaliation 
provision of Title VII may have been an appropriate textual analysis, but it 
defeated the purposes of the GWA, which is an anti-retaliation statute. The 
Burlington North standard focuses on deterrence, which is the point of an 
anti-retaliation statute.118 By allowing employers to “make an example of” 
an employee in an open act of hostility that falls short of the harsher anti-
discrimination statute, the employer can deter employees and prevent 
reports of misconduct, all without ramification. 
An additional development is currently working its way through the 
courts, though it has not yet led to an opinion.119 At least one large public 
employer has attempted to argue for the judicial adoption of what is known 
as the “employee duty rule.” This rule comes from litigation under the 
federal WPA prior to the adoption of the WPEA, which overruled those 
cases.120 
The employee duty rule states that an employee does not engage in 
protected activity when the employee reports something within the scope of 
that employee’s ordinary job duties.121 Under this rule, a compliance officer 
 
116 Id. at 438. 
117 Id. at 438–39. 
118 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006). 
119 Due to confidentiality concerns, the author is unable to provide citations to cases, but 
the author has seen this development arise multiple times. 
120 Ann C. Hodges & Justin Pugh, Crossing the Thin Blue Line: Protecting Law 
Enforcement Officers Who Blow the Whistle, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 1, 27 
(2018); Heidi Kitrosser, On Public Employees and Judicial Buck-Passing: The 
Respective Roles of Statutory and Constitutional Protections for Government 
Whistleblowers, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1699, 1708 (2019). 
121 Wolf v. Pac. Nat’l Bank, No. 09-21531, 2010 WL 5888778, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 
2010) (collecting cases). 
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would not be protected by the GWA because the compliance officer’s job is 
to find and report violations of laws, rules, and regulations. At the federal 
level, Congress passed the WPEA to overturn this rule.122 State 
whistleblower laws, however, are often unclear because they do not provide 
or prohibit an employee duty rule.123 Georgia is one of these states; it does 
not provide or prohibit the rule in its whistleblower statute.124 In the 
author’s experience, Georgia trial courts have been unwilling to weigh in on 
the employee duty rule, instead relying on the cases referenced above to 
dismiss cases and avoid the discussion. 
The employee duty rule is likely to make its way to the Georgia Court of 
Appeals at some point, and, if adopted, it will be disastrous for public 
whistleblowers in Georgia. The employee duty rule is particularly 
dangerous in light of Coward. The employees who are likely to know which 
law is being broken and identify a violated law, rule, or regulation for their 
employer are probably the ones whose job duties specifically involve 
reporting violations of that law, rule, or regulation. They likely received 
training on the law, rule, or regulation because it is their job to find and 
report potential violations. Employees who see that something is wrong, but 
are not sure what, will run into the Coward rule. Employees who are trained 
and experienced at spotting violations will run into the employee duty rule. 
Either way, there will be no protection, and the GWA will be nearly 
useless. 
IV. FEDERAL EMPLOYEE WHISTLEBLOWER LAW 
As shown above, Georgia courts have compared the GWA to Title VII 
and made GWA cases more difficult for plaintiffs than Title VII cases. For 
 
122 Samantha Arrington Sliney, Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean: The 
Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Application of Whistleblower Protection Laws to 
Disclosures Made Contrary to Transportation Security Administration Regulations, 8 
N.E. U. L.J. 397, 400 (2016). 
123 See Hodges & Pugh, supra note 117, at 27. 
124 See generally O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4. 
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federal employee whistleblowers, however, the applicable law is the 
Whistleblower Protection Act.125 Copying the federal WPA in its entirety is 
likely not the solution for the problems facing the GWA, but some parts of 
the WPA can provide useful inspiration for how the problems with the 
GWA may be addressed. 
Although whistleblower protections at the federal level can be traced 
back to 1778,126 the modern iteration was first enacted within the 1978 Civil 
Service Reform Act.127 In 1989, Congress unanimously passed the current 
WPA.128 As amended in 1994 and again with the passage of the WPEA in 
2012,129 the WPA protects most employees and applicants of the federal 
Executive Branch and the Government Printing Office.130 It also protects 
former employees.131 
The WPA does not use the McDonnell Douglas framework; instead, it 
uses a different framework. The plaintiff must first prove—by a 
preponderance of the evidence—his or her prima facie case by showing 
(1) the acting official had the authority to take any personnel 
action; (2) the aggrieved employee made a protected disclosure; 
(3) the acting official used his authority to take or refuse to take, a 
 
125 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). 
126 Connor Berkebile, Note, The Puzzle of Whistleblower Protection Legislation: 
Assembling the Piecemeal, 28 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2018). 
127 See Sliney, supra note 120, at 399. 
128 Id. at 399–400. 
129 See id. at 400; see also Pub. L. No. 112–199. 
130 The WPA excludes employees who are “excepted from the competitive service 
because of [their job’s] confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-
advocating character.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(B)(i).  Certain positions may also be 
excluded from coverage by an Executive Order of the President, but the exclusion cannot 
come after the adverse personnel action. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(B)(ii). Additionally, the 
WPA excludes from coverage employees involved in foreign intelligence and counter-
intelligence operations. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii). Although employees of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation are listed in the excluded category, they are covered separately, 
with specific requirements concerning how reports are made. 5 U.S.C. § 2303. 
131 5 U.S.C. § 1221. 
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personnel action; and (4) the protected disclosure was a 
contributing factor in the agency’s personnel action.132 
The first element is important because of how adverse actions work under 
the WPA. Because it is tied to the adverse action prong (element (3) above), 
the two will be discussed together. 
An adverse action under the WPA is when an employee “take[s] or fail[s] 
to take, or threaten[s] to take or fail to take, a personnel action” against a 
covered employee or applicant.133  The list of “personnel action[s]” is long, 
comprising twelve numbered items, only one of which covers traditional 
adverse actions like suspension, demotion, and removal.134 The WPA 
covers actions such as temporary details,135 performance evaluations,136 and 
the implementation or enforcement of nondisclosure policies or 
agreements.137 Authority to take the action matters both because the list of 
actions is broad and because threats to take an action are also covered.138 
The first element, when added to the third, ensures that the adverse action is 
genuine. 
For the second element, protected activity, the WPA protects employees 
and applicants who disclose information they reasonably believe shows: 
(i) any violation of any law, rule or regulation, or 
(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of 
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or 
safety, if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and 
if such information is not specifically required by Executive order 
 
132 King v. Dep’t of the Army, 570 Fed. Appx. 863, 865 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing 
Chambers v. Dep’t of the Interior, 602 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
133 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). 
134 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 7502, 7512. 
135 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(iv). 
136 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(viii). 
137 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xi). 
138 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). 
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to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct 
of foreign affairs.139 
The WPA also protects: 
any disclosure to the Special Counsel, or to the Inspector General 
of an agency or another employee designated by the head of the 
agency to receive such disclosures, of information which the 
employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences – 
(i) any violation (other than a violation of this section) of any law, 
rule, or regulation, or 
(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of 
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or 
safety.140 
The distinction between the two provisions stems from the fact that a 
disclosure need not be to internal authorities or law enforcement; a 
disclosure can be made to the media, so long as the disclosure is not 
prohibited by law.141 
Disclosures can be formal or informal,142 may be made directly to a 
supervisor or the person alleged to be committing—or attempting to 
commit—a violation,143 need not be made in writing or while the employee 
was on duty,144 and are still protected if made during the normal course of 
an employee’s duties.145 A disclosure is protected even when the employee 
has an impure motive in making it.146 The WPA also has a participation 
clause, which protects employees who “exercise . . . any appeal, complaint, 
 
139 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). 
140 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(B). 
141 See, e.g., Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 574 U.S. 383, 917 (2014); Chambers 
v. Dep’t of the Interior, 602 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
142 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(D). 
143 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(1)(A). 
144 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(1)(D)-(E). 
145 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2). 
146 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(1)(C). 
146 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
or grievance right;”147 testify or lawfully assist someone else in exercising 
an appeal, complaint, or grievance right;148 or cooperate with an 
investigation.149 Finally, the WPA has an objection clause to protect 
employees who refuse to obey an order that would violate a law, rule, or 
regulation.150 
The WPA sets out a statutory list of factors to be considered for 
causation using the contributing factor standard.151 The statutory factors to 
consider are: “(A) the official taking the personnel action knew of the 
disclosure or protected activity; and (B) the personnel action occurred 
within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that 
the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the 
personnel action.”152 “The words ‘a contributing factor’ . . . mean any factor 
which, alone or in connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way 
the outcome of the decision.”153 This standard is much more lenient towards 
employees than the normal standards, such as the McDonnell Douglas 
framework, which require proof that the “protected conduct was a 
‘significant,’ ‘motivating,’ ‘substantial,’ or ‘predominant’ factor.”154 
Once the employee proves their prima facie case, the burden shifts back 
to the employer, who must do more than merely articulate an alleged reason 
for the action; it must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would 
have taken the same action in the absence of protected activity.155 The 
factors to consider when deciding whether an agency has satisfied its 
 
147 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A). 
148 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(B). 
149 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C). 
150 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D). 
151 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). 
152 Id. 
153 Marano v. Dep’t of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original) 
(collecting legislative history of the WPA). 
154 Id. at 1140. 
155 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2); see also Marano, 2 F.3d at 1141. 
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burden are known as the Carr factors,156 from Carr v. Social Security 
Administration.157 The Carr factors are as follows: 
(1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its 
personnel action; (2) the existence and strength of any motive to 
retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved in 
the decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency takes similar 
actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are 
otherwise similarly situated.158 
The requirement that the government prove its case by clear and convincing 
evidence was deliberate, as indicated by the following quote on the 
Congressional record: 
“Clear and convincing evidence” is a high burden of proof for the 
Government to bear. It is intended as such for two reasons. First, 
this burden of proof comes into play only if the employee has 
established by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
whistleblowing was a contributing factor in the action – in other 
words, that the agency action was tainted. Second, this heightened 
burden of proof required of the agency also recognizes that when it 
comes to proving the basis for an agency’s decision, the agency 
controls most of the cards – the drafting of the documents 
supporting the decision, the testimony of witnesses who 
participated in the decision, and the records that could document 
whether similar personnel actions have been taken in other cases. 
In these circumstances, it is entirely appropriate that the agency 
bear a heavy burden to justify its actions.159 
Congress has also used this type of burden shifting in cases under the 
Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act,160 the Energy Reorganization 
 
156 See, e.g., Whitmore v. Dep’t of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
157 Carr v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 185 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
158 Id. at 1323 (numbering added). 
159 135 Cong. Rec. H747–48 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989); see also Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 
1367 (quoting the same passage). 
160 15 U.S.C. § 2087; see, e.g., Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97, 114 (2nd Cir. 2019). 
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Act,161 the Federal Railroad Safety Act,162 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.163 
This burden shifting is significantly more employee friendly than the 
McDonnell Douglas framework, but there are solid reasons for adopting it 
in actions against the government. 
If the employee wins their case, they are entitled to “corrective action.”164 
“Corrective action” may include reinstatement to the same or a similar 
position, back pay and benefits, medical costs, travel expenses, 
consequential damages, and compensatory damages.165  A prevailing 
employee, former employee, or applicant is entitled to attorney fees and 
litigation costs.166 These remedies are similar to those in the GWA.167 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The first available solution to the recent court decisions eviscerating the 
GWA is for the Georgia Supreme Court to begin to take GWA cases again 
and overrule the Georgia Court of Appeals. All the recent cases discussed 
above have been decided at the court of appeals. For some reason, the 
Georgia Supreme Court is not weighing in on the problem. Assuming the 
Georgia Supreme Court does not intend to overrule the Georgia Court of 
Appeals, it will be up to the Georgia General Assembly to amend the GWA. 
Keeping with the order in which this paper introduced the GWA, the 
following areas require amendment: (A) coverage; (B) protected activity; 
(C) adverse action; and (D) causation and burden shifting. A full copy of 
the suggested amended version of the GWA is included in Appendix A. 
 
161 42 U.S.C. § 5851; see, e.g., Sanders v. Energy Nw., 812 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
162 49 U.S.C. § 20109; see, e.g., Pan Am Railways, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 855 F.3d 
29, 36 (1st Cir. 2017). 
163 18 U.S.C. § 1514A; see, e.g., Harp v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 558 F.3d 722, 723 (7th 
Cir. 2009). 
164 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). 
165 5 U.S.C. § 1221(g)(1)(A). 
166 5 U.S.C. § 1221(g)(1)(B); 5 U.S.C. § 1221(g)(2). 
167 See supra note 14. 
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A. Coverage 
The problem that has developed regarding coverage is the lack of 
protection for former employees.168 The clearest solution is to amend the 
definition of “public employee” at O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(3). The suggested 
language would read: 
(3) “Public employee” means any person who is employed by the 
executive, judicial, or legislative branch of the state or by any 
other department, board, bureau, commission, authority, or other 
agency of the state.  This term also includes all employees, 
officials, and administrators of any agency covered by the rules of 
the State Personnel Board and any local or regional governmental 
entity that receives any funds from the State of Georgia or any 
state agency.  This term also includes former public employees and 
applicants for public employment. 
“[A]pplicants for public employment” was added to address a scenario 
where a public employer tells a former employee’s prospective new 
employer about the employee’s protected activity and ruins the employee’s 
chance of getting a new job. In the absence of a confidentiality agreement 
or the above amended language, the former employer would not be liable in 
this scenario.169 
The above suggested language would likely require some additional 
language in the protected activity section to prevent protection for activities 
outside the scope of government operations. Those edits will be addressed 
in the next section. 
 
168 See supra nn. 81–86. 
169 See Murray-Obertein v. Ga. Gov’t Transparency and Campaign Fin. Comm’n, 812 
S.E.2d 28, 30-31 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018); see also O.C.G.A. § 34-1-4. If O.C.G.A. § 45-1-
4(c) is amended or interpreted to protect reports under subsection (d), then there would 
be an argument for liability for the former employer, but this is unlikely to happen. See 
supra p. 7 (discussion of subsections (b) and (c)). 
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B. Protected Activity 
The problems facing protected activity are the Coward rule170 and the 
potential employee duty rule.171 Additionally, an amendment to the GWA 
will be required if coverage is extended to former employees and 
applicants. The three kinds of protected activity discussed are 
disclosures,172 participation,173 and objections.174 The author recommends 
adding a definition of these items to the definitions list in subsection (a) of 
the GWA, which would then include the following items: 
(7) “Protected activity” means any activity constituting a protected 
disclosure, protected participation, or a protected objection. 
Disclosures, participation, and objections are protected regardless 
of whether the activity: 
(A) is made or performed during the normal course of 
duties of the public employee; 
(B) is made to a supervisor or to a person who 
participated in an activity that the public employee 
reasonably believed to be covered by the protected 
activity; 
(C) reveals information that had been previously 
disclosed; 
(D) is made in writing; or 
(E) is made or performed while the public employee is off 
duty; 
but disclosures and objections shall only constitute protected 
activity if made while the public employee is employed by a public 
employer. 
 
170 See supra nn. 71–80 
171 See supra nn. 116–120. 
172 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(2); 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). 
173 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)-(C). 
174 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(3); 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D). 
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(8) “Protected disclosure” means a formal or informal 
communication or transmission of information to a supervisor or 
government agency by a public employee which the public 
employee reasonably believes evidences: 
(A) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or 
(B) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an 
abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to 
public health or safety. 
(9) “Protected participation” means: 
(A) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance 
right granted by any law, rule, or regulation that concerns 
or relates to retaliation under this Code section; 
(B) testifying for or otherwise lawfully assisting any 
individual in the exercise of any right referred to in 
subparagraph (A); 
(C) cooperating with or disclosing information in an 
investigation, hearing, or court proceeding in connection 
with protected activity under this Code section. 
(10) “Protected objection” means objecting to, or refusing to 
participate in, any activity, policy, or practice of the public 
employer that the public employee has reasonable cause to believe 
is in violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation. 
The language for protected disclosures is taken directly from the WPA, 
with a modification to keep the scope limited to reports to a supervisor or 
government agency, as is the current limitation within the GWA.175 
Language was added to ensure that disclosures and objections are only 
protected if they occur while the employee is employed by a public 
employer. This is designed to make sure that reports and objections must be 
made to the public employer, but participation can happen after the 
employee has left. This ensures that a prospective or former employee 
 
175 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8); O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4. 
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cannot gain protection (and a potential lawsuit) preemptively to increase his 
or her chances of being hired or preventing a bad reference, while still 
protecting those who engage in legitimate activities, including 
investigations, hearings, or court proceedings after the employee has left. 
The fact that a disclosure is defined as “information constituting a 
violation” should remove the Coward rule. The language in proposed 
section (7)(A) is designed to foreclose the employee duty rule. Other added 
language not specifically mentioned above is meant to track the WPA and 
use clearer language to help resist judicial pushback against an amendment. 
In an effort to provide uniformity throughout the GWA and apply the 
confidentiality provision of subsection (c) to all reports, subsection (b) 
should be amended as follows: 
(b) A public employer may receive and investigate protected 
disclosures complaints or information from any public employee 
concerning the possible existence of any activity constituting 
fraud, waste, and abuse in or relating to any state programs and 
operations under the jurisdiction of such public employer. 
In addition, subsections (B) and (C) from the definition of “supervisor” 
should be amended as follows: 
(B) To whom a public employer has given authority to take 
corrective action regarding a protected disclosure by a violation of 
or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation of which the 
public employee complains; or 
(C) Who has been designated by a public employer to receive 
protected disclosures complaints regarding a violation of or 
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation. 
C. Adverse Action 
The full scope of protected activity under the WPA is likely neither 
necessary for the GWA nor likely to be passed in Georgia. Adopting the 
Burlington North standard should be sufficient. The best way to do so is to 
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amend the definition of “retaliation,” which would change subsection (a)(5) 
to read as follows: 
(5) “Retaliate” or “retaliation” refers to the discharge, suspension, 
or demotion by a public employer of a public employee or any 
other adverse employment action taken by a public employer 
against a public employee that might dissuade a reasonable 
employee from engaging in protected activity.in the terms or 
conditions of employment for disclosing a violation of or 
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor 
or government agency. 
To adopt this standard and harmonize subsection (d) with the other 
changes presented, subsections (1) through (4) would be adjusted as 
follows: 
(1) No public employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any policy or 
practice preventing a public employee from engaging in protected 
activity. disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a law, 
rule, or regulation to either a supervisor or a government agency. 
(2) No public employer shall retaliate against a public employee 
for engaging in protected activity. for disclosing a violation of or 
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor 
or a government agency, unless the disclosure was made with 
knowledge that the disclosure was false or with reckless disregard 
for its truth or falsity. 
(3) No public employer shall retaliate against a public employee 
for objecting to, or refusing to participate in, any activity, policy, 
or practice of the public employer that the public employee has 
reasonable cause to believe in in violation of or noncompliance 
with a law, rule, or regulation. 
(4)(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2)(1), (2), and (3) of this subsection 
shall not apply to policies or practices which implement, or to 
actions by public employers against employees who violate, 
privilege or confidentiality obligations recognized by 
constitutional, statutory, or common law. 
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D. Causation and Burden Shifting 
Because of how the courts have handled burden shifting,176 the author 
recommends switching to the WPA contributing factor test, which affects 
causation and burden shifting together. To prevent shifting subsection 
(e)(2), the following language—taken largely from the WPA,177 with some 
language taken from the mixed motive language from Title VII178—would 
be added: 
(g) 
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2), in any case 
under this Code section, the court shall order relief under 
paragraphs (e) and (f) if the public employee has 
demonstrated that protected activity was a contributing 
factor in retaliation against the public employee by the 
public employer, even though other factors also motivated 
the adverse action. The public employee may demonstrate 
that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the 
personnel action through circumstantial evidence. 
(2) Relief under paragraphs (e) and (f) may not be ordered 
if, after a finding that protected activity was a 
contributing factor, the public employer demonstrates by 
clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken 
the same adverse action in the absence of such protected 
activity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Because Georgia courts are unwilling to enforce the GWA, the General 
Assembly must act to protect taxpayers from unlawful acts by public 
servants. This includes protecting those public employees who fulfill their 
duty and report wrongdoing. By looking to federal whistleblower 
protections, the General Assembly can address the recent court decisions 
 
176 See supra nn. 44–55. 
177 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e). 
178 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) 
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that have eviscerated the GWA through an amendment. By incorporating 
aspects of other functioning anti-retaliation laws, the language provided 
within this article will overrule the recent judicial push-back against the 
GWA while balancing the interests of the public, public employees, and 
public employers. 
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APPENDIX 
The Amended GWA, O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4: 
 
(a) As used in this Code section, the term: 
(1) “Government agency” means any agency of federal, state, or 
local government charged with the enforcement of laws, rules, or 
regulations. 
(2) “Law, rule, or regulation” includes any federal, state, or local 
statute or ordinance or any rule or regulation adopted according to 
any federal, state, or local statute or ordinance. 
(3) “Public employee” means any person who is employed by the 
executive, judicial, or legislative branch of the state or by any 
other department, board, bureau, commission, authority, or other 
agency of the state. This term also includes all employees, 
officials, and administrators of any agency covered by the rules of 
the State Personnel Board and any local or regional governmental 
entity that receives any funds from the State of Georgia or any 
state agency. This term also includes former public employees and 
applicants for public employment. 
(4) “Public employer” means the executive, judicial, or legislative 
branch of the state; any other department, board, bureau, 
commission, authority, or other agency of the state which employs 
or appoints a public employee or public employees; or any local or 
regional governmental entity that receives any funds from the State 
of Georgia or any state agency. 
(5) “Retaliate” or “retaliation” refers to the discharge, suspension, 
or demotion by a public employer of a public employee or any 
other adverse employment action taken by a public employer 
against a public employee that might dissuade a reasonable 
employee from engaging in protected activity.in the terms or 
conditions of employment for disclosing a violation of or 
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor 
or government agency. 
(6) “Supervisor” means any individual: 
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(A) To whom a public employer has given authority to 
direct and control the work performance of the affected 
public employee; 
(B) To whom a public employer has given authority to 
take corrective action regarding a protected disclosure by 
a violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or 
regulation of which the public employee complains; or 
(C) Who has been designated by a public employer to 
receive protected disclosures complaints regarding a 
violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or 
regulation. 
(7) “Protected activity” means any activity constituting a protected 
disclosure, protected participation, or a protected objection. 
Disclosures, participation, and objections are protected regardless 
of whether the activity: 
(A) is made or performed during the normal course of 
duties of the public employee; 
(B) is made to a supervisor or to a person who 
participated in an activity that the public employee 
reasonably believed to be covered by the protected 
activity; 
(C) reveals information that had been previously 
disclosed; 
(D) is made in writing; or 
(E) is made or performed while the public employee is off 
duty; 
but disclosures and objections shall only constitute protected 
activity if made while the public employee is employed by a public 
employer. 
(8) “Protected disclosure” means a formal or informal 
communication or transmission of information to a supervisor or 
government agency by a public employee which the public 
employee reasonably believes evidences: 
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(A) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or 
(B) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an 
abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to 
public health or safety. 
(9) “Protected participation” means: 
(A) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance 
right granted by any law, rule, or regulation that concerns 
or relates to retaliation under this Code section; 
(B) testifying for or otherwise lawfully assisting any 
individual in the exercise of any right referred to in 
subparagraph (A); 
(C) cooperating with or disclosing information in an 
investigation, hearing, or court proceeding in connection 
with protected activity under this Code section. 
(10) “Protected objection” means objecting to, or refusing to 
participate in, any activity, policy, or practice of the public 
employer that the public employee has reasonable cause to believe 
is in violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation. 
(b) A public employer may receive and investigate protected disclosures 
complaints or information from any public employee concerning the 
possible existence of any activity constituting fraud, waste, and abuse in or 
relating to any state programs and operations under the jurisdiction of such 
public employer. 
(c) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, such public employer 
shall not after receipt of a complaint or information from a public employee 
disclose the identity of the public employee without the written consent of 
such public employee, unless the public employer determines such 
disclosure is necessary and unavoidable during the course of the 
investigation. In such event, the public employee shall be notified in writing 
at least seven days prior to such disclosure. 
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(d) 
(1) No public employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any policy or 
practice preventing a public employee from engaging in protected 
activity disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a law, 
rule, or regulation to either a supervisor or a government agency. 
(2) No public employer shall retaliate against a public employee 
for engaging in protected activity for disclosing a violation of or 
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor 
or a government agency, unless the disclosure was made with 
knowledge that the disclosure was false or with reckless disregard 
for its truth or falsity. 
(3) No public employer shall retaliate against a public employee 
for objecting to, or refusing to participate in, any activity, policy, 
or practice of the public employer that the public employee has 
reasonable cause to believe in in violation of or noncompliance 
with a law, rule, or regulation. 
(4)(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2)(1), (2), and (3) of this subsection 
shall not apply to policies or practices which implement, or to 
actions by public employers against employees who violate, 
privilege or confidentiality obligations recognized by 
constitutional, statutory, or common law. 
(e) 
(1) A public employee who has been the object of retaliation in 
violation of this Code section may institute a civil action in 
superior court for relief as set forth in paragraph (2) of this 
subsection within one year after discovering the retaliation or 
within three years after the retaliation, whichever is earlier. 
(2) In any action brought pursuant to this subsection, the court may 
order any or all of the following relief: 
(A) An injunction restraining continued violation of this 
Code section; 
(B) Reinstatement of the employee to the same position 
held before the retaliation or to an equivalent position; 
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(C) Reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority 
rights; 
(D) Compensation for lost wages, benefits, and other 
remuneration; and 
(E) Any other compensatory damages allowable at law. 
(F) A court may award reasonable attorney’s fees, court 
costs, and expenses to a prevailing public employee. 
(g) 
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2), in any case under 
this Code section, the court shall order relief under paragraphs (e) 
and (f) if the public employee has demonstrated that protected 
activity was a contributing factor in retaliation against the public 
employee by the public employer, even though other factors also 
motivated the adverse action. The public employee may 
demonstrate that the protected activity was a contributing factor in 
the personnel action through circumstantial evidence. 
(2) Relief under paragraphs (e) and (f) may not be ordered if, after 
a finding that protected activity was a contributing factor, the 
public employer demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence 
that it would have taken the same adverse action in the absence of 
such protected activity. 
